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Abstract
The existing literature on the eﬀect of recycling on a virgin producer’s
market power assumes that the entire output of the recyclable product
produced in any period is available to the recycling ﬁrms as scrap in a sub-
sequent period. The consumers’ decision whether to participate in recycling
or not is, however, not modelled. Instead it is implicitly assumed that all
consumers sort the recyclable product from their household garbage. We re-
lax this assumption in Swan’s (Journal of Political Economy, 1980) model.
When recycling requires consumers to undertake costly sorting activities to
separate scrap from household garbage, they will participate only if the net
reward from sorting is positive. With heterogeneous consumers diﬀering
in terms of their sorting cost, the entire output of the recyclable product
may not be subsequently available as scrap to the recycling ﬁrms. This
has implications for the virgin producer’s monopoly power, and may also
lead to multiple equilibria if the “network eﬀect” of sorting is suﬃciently
large. The latter result suggests a role for the government in inﬂuencing
equilibrium selection to improve social welfare, for example by encouraging
more recycling.
1. Introduction
The growing environmental consciousness within society has re-
sulted in the increase in the recycling rate over time in many countries.
The percentage of municipal solid waste recycled in the US, for exam-
ple, has increased from 6.4%, or 5.6 million tons of material, in 1960
to 30.6%, or 72.3 million tons, in 2003.1 Recycling is important not
only because it promotes conservation of natural resources through
reduced use of virgin (i.e. non-recycled) materials, but also because
it reduces the amount of waste that has to be disposed oﬀ through
landﬁlling or incineration.
1Source: http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/facts.htm.
For similar data on some other OECD countries, see
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The process of recyclying involves two essential steps: the genera-
tion and supply of scrap material by consumers, and the transforma-
tion of that scrap into secondary material by recycling ﬁrms. Thus,
how much recycling ﬁnally takes place depends on decisions that are
made by both consumers and recycling ﬁrms. However, the extant
literature on the “recycling problem” has typically focussed on the
role of the recycling ﬁrms and not the consumers (see, for examples,
Gaskin, 1974; Swan, 1980; Martin, 1982; Suslow, 1986; Tirole, 1988;
Grant, 1999; Gaudet and Long, 2003).2 Motivated by the celebrated
Alcoa case of 1945, most of these papers examine the restraints im-
posed by the existence of a competitive recyling sector on a monopoly
virgin producer’s ability to markup price over cost.3 All these papers,
however, assume total participation by all (homogeneous) consumers
in the recycling process. Consequently, in these models, the entire
output of a recyclable product bought by consumers in one period
b e c o m e sa v a i l a b l et ot h er e c y c l i n gﬁr m sa ss c r a pi nt h en e x tp e r i o d .
The above assumption about consumer participation is not a re-
alistic one for many households. In order to recycle their household
garbage, consumers must ﬁrst sort recyclables from non-recyclables.
Next, the recyclables have to be taken to the curbside or to the nearest
drop-oﬀ depot. In either case, participation in recycling is costly to
the consumers in terms of their time and eﬀort. The magnitude of
this intrinsic cost (or disutility) of recycling varies across consumers.
More environmentally friendly consumers are likely to have a lower
cost of recycling. Given this heterogeneity, it is natural to expect that
some consumers will take part in the recycling process whilst others
will not. In other words, the entire output of a recyclable material
purchased by consumers in one period will not be available as scrap
2Grant (1999, p. 59) deﬁnes the recycling problem as “the optimal pricing
problem facing the dominant producer of a recyclable good”.
3In the Alcoa case, Justice Learned Hand ruled that the Aluminum Company
of America constituted an illegal monopoly as its share of the virgin aluminum
market exceeded 90 percent. Alcoa’s arguement that its share of the total (i.e.
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to the recycling ﬁrms for reprocessing in a subsequent period, as some
part of it (i.e. the part which was purchased by non-recycling con-
sumers) will be disposed oﬀ as waste. Our paper presents a model of
partial recycling when consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their
recycling cost.
Although the intrinsic cost of recycling for each consumer will be
idiosyncratic to that consumer, it is also likely to be inﬂuenced by
social norms. In particular, the incentive for, or (indirect) social pres-
sure on, a consumer to recycle will likely increase as more consumers
around him start recycling. We assume the existence of such a “net-
work eﬀect” which modiﬁes each consumer’s recycling cost.4 This is
in the spirit of Akerlof and Kranton (2005), who argue that in many
social situations (dis)utility functions are not ﬁxed (as traditionally
assumed in neoclassical economics) but situation dependent. The ex-
istence of this network eﬀect leads to the possibility of multiple equi-
libria arising in our model. An implication of our model is that a
welfare-maximizing government might have a role to play in equilib-
rium selection.
What fraction of consumers will participate in recycling depends on
consumers’ recycling cost and the reward they receive from recycling.
Following Swan’s (1980, p. 86) “more sophisticated model”, we assume
that consumers are able to sell the scrap to recycling ﬁrms for a price
(once they have sorted their household garbage). However, unlike
Swan, we assume that sorting is costly, and the sorting cost varies
across consumers, so that, in general, not all consumers participate.
The scrap price is determined endogenously by the recycling market.
Such markets for scrap are common in many developing countries such
4That an individual’s recycling decision can be inﬂuenced by others is, for
example, acknowledged by the Manitoba Product Stewardship Corporation (the
provincial body in charge of administering the recycling program in Manitoba). In
its “Community Recycling Handbook” (2003, Section 5-3), MPSC lists the follow-
ing among “factors that motivate people to recycle”: (i) setting a good example,
(ii) the right thing to do. See http://www.mpsc.com/main.asp?contentID=25 for
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as China and India.5
Further details about our model are provided in Section 2. Much of
the model setup, with the notable exception of Section 2.2 which deals
with consumers, follows Swan (1980). The steady state is derived in
Section 2.3. We ﬁnd that multiple equilibria arise only when the values
of the network eﬀect and the scrap price satisfy certain conditions.
Moreover, the long-run price charged by the virgin producer is found
to depend on both the endogenous fraction of consumers who recycle,
which the virgin producer can manipulate by its pricing strategy, as
well as the fraction of secondary aluminum recovered per unit scrap
by the recycling ﬁrms. Section 3 examines the impact of an increase
in the network eﬀect on the price of virgin. The sign of this impact
can be positive or negative, depending on the fraction of consumers
that participates in recycling. Section 4 provides a numerical example
in support of our analytical results. The last section concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Recycling ﬁrms
Recycling ﬁrms are perfectly competitive. Each unit of scrapped
aluminum can be transformed into γ unit of virgin-equivalent (sec-
ondary) aluminum at the cost z(γ) per unit of scrap, where γ ∈ [0,1]
is a decision variable. The function z(γ) is assumed to be convex and
increasing in γ, and independent of the number of units of scrap to be
recycled.
The price of a unit of virgin as well as secondary aluminum in
period t is pt. The recycling ﬁrm chooses γt to maximize
ptγt − z(γt)
subject to 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1. This gives the optimal γt as a function of pt.
5In the US, certain items such as old printer ink cartridges can be sold for cash.
See http://www.freerecycling.com for details.Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 5








z00 > 0. (1)
Let φt denote the price per unit of scrap that recyclers pay to
consumers who make the scrap available by sorting. The proﬁtp e r
unit of scrap is
πt = ptγ(pt) − z(γ(pt)) − φt.
Assume that competition by recyclers drives proﬁt πt to zero. This
implies that φt is uniquely determined by
φt = ptγ(pt) − z(γ(pt)) ≡ φ(pt). (2)
It is easy to show that φ
0(pt) > 0,a n d0 <φ (pt) ≤ pt.
2.2. Consumers
A consumer that buys, in period t, qt units of virgin or secondary







I nt h ef o l l o w i n gp e r i o d ,h eh a sa th i sd i s p o s a lst+1 units of scrap,
where st+1 = qt. He can sell each unit of scrap at the market price
φt+1, provided that he sorts the scrap from the household garbage.
Diﬀerent consumers have diﬀerent sorting costs. Consumers are
indexed by a parameter θ. Assume θ is uniformly distributed over
the unit interval [0,1]. The population is normalized at unity. The
per-unit sorting cost of consumer θ at time t is
θ(1 − αft)Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 6
where α ∈ [0,1] is the “network eﬀect” parameter, and ft is the frac-
tion of the population who undertake sorting in period t.W e m a y
interpret θ as an intrinsic cost of sorting (e.g. it reﬂects the nuisance
of having to spend time sorting), and αft is the proportional reduction
in the intrinsic cost due to network eﬀe c t( o r ,c u l t u r a le ﬀects).
How many units the consumer of type θ chooses to purchase in
period t depends on two things: (i) the price he must pay, pt,a n d
(ii) the return per unit he gets next period by sorting and selling the
scrap. This return per unit is denoted by Rt+1(θ) where
Rt+1(θ) ≡ max
£
φt+1 − θ(1 − αft+1),0
¤
≤ φt+1 ≤ pt+1.
Given φt+1 ≥ 0 and ft+1, all the consumers whose θ are low enough
so that Rt+1 > 0 will undertake sorting, and the remaining consumers
w i l ln o ts o r t .H o wd ow ed e t e r m i n et h et h r e s h o l dv a l u eo fθ (denote
this as xt+1) that separates sorters from non-sorters at time t+1?S i n c e
θ is uniformly distributed, its threshold value xt+1 also determines the
fraction of population that sort at time t +1 , i.e.
xt+1 = ft+1.
Given φt+1 ≥ 0, consider the quadratic equation
xt+1(1 − αxt+1)=φt+1 ≥ 0 (4)
Either this equation has no real roots b x ∈ [0,1], or it has one or two
real roots b x ∈ [0,1]. When there are two real roots, they are denoted
by xL
t+1 and xH


























g(x) ≡ x(1 − αx).Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 7





g(1) = 1 − α
and g(x) attains its maximum value (called maximum sorting cost) at









≥ 1 − α,
where the inequality follows from the fact that α(1 − α) attains its
maximum at α =1 /2 (the strict inequality holds if α 6=1 /2).
In the determination of the threshold value xt+1, the following two
mutually exclusive cases can arise depending on the values of α (the
network eﬀect parameter) and φt+1 (the scrap price).
Case A: α>1/2.
(i) if φt+1 > 1/(4α) then equation (4) has no real root. The price
of scrap exceeds the maximum sorting cost, so all consumers will sort,
i.e., xt+1 =1
(ii) if φt+1 =1 /(4α) then xt+1 =1 /(2α),o rxt+1 =1(because
θ(1 − α) ≤ (1 − α) < 1/(4α)=φt+1).
(iii) if 1 − α ≤ φt+1 < 1/(4α) then xt+1 = xL
t+1 or xH
t+1 or 1
(iv) if φt+1 < 1 − α then xt+1 = xL
t+1
Case B: α ≤ 1/2
(i) if φt+1 ≥ 1 − α then xt+1 =1
(ii) if φt+1 < 1 − α then xt+1 = xL
t+1
Thus we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In the determination of the threshold value (xt+1)
that separates sorters from non-sorters at time t+1, multiple equilibria
arise if and only if the network eﬀect parameter is high (speciﬁcally
α>1/2)a n dt h es c r a pp r i c ei si n t e r m e d i a t e( s p e c i ﬁcally 1 − α ≤
φt+1 ≤ 1/(4α)).Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 8
Only consumers with θ less than the threshold value xt+1 sort and
sell their recyclables at t+1; these consumers receive a positive return
Rt+1. The remaining consumers (i.e. those with θ greater than or
equal to xt+1) receive zero return at time t +1 .L e tδ ∈ (0,1) be the
discount factor. Then the net price, pN
t ,t h a tc o n s u m e rθ pays for a
unit of virgin aluminum at time t equals
p
N











≡ xt+1 (φ(pt+1)),( 7 )
At time t, the consumer θ must know both pt and pt+1 to compute
pN
t (θ) before deciding on the quantity qt(θ) to be bought. The quantity
qt(θ) must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition
u
0 (qt(θ)) = p
N
t (θ)




where we assume that the choke price, a, is greater than the net price,
pN
t (θ).












φt+1 − θ(1 − αft+1)
¤
dθ,
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Making use of (4)
Qt = a − pt +
δ
2
xt+1φt+1 ≡ Qt(pt,p t+1) (9)
Total demand of aluminum by the consumers who do not sort and
recycle in t +1(i.e. those with θ ≥ xt+1)i s
Q
NR
t ≡ (1 − xt+1)(a − pt)
where NR stands for “non-recycler”. Therefore, the amount of scrap
that consumers supply to recyclers in period t +1is









Making use of (4)
St+1 = xt+1
½




≡ St+1(pt,p t+1) (10)
and this yields γ(pt+1)St+1 units of secondary (virgin-equivalent) alu-
minum in t +1 .
2.3. Virgin Producer and the Steady State
Primary or virgin aluminum is produced by a monopolist. The
amount of virgin produced by the monopolist in period t is Qt −γtSt.
Let c denote the constant marginal cost of virgin production. The
monopolist’s proﬁti np e r i o dt is
Πt =( pt − c)[Qt(pt,p t+1) − γ(pt)St(pt−1,p t)]
where Qt is given by (9) and St+1 is given by (10).
The monopolist must choose a sequence of prices {pt} that maxi-
mizes the present value of his proﬁts over time
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Let the steady state values of the variables be denoted by an as-












































Collecting terms, and using (9) and (10), the steady state ﬁrst




































∗ =0 . (12)Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 11
Note that in the special case where there is no recycling, x =0 ,




which is the familiar marginal revenue (p∗+Q∗p0) equals marginal cost
(c)c o n d i t i o n .
Proposition 2: The long-run price of aluminum will be close to
the competitive price if and only if both the fraction of consumers that
sort, as well as the fraction of virgin-equivalent aluminum recovered
per unit of scrap by the recycling ﬁrms, are close to one.
Proof: From (12), p∗ = c iﬀ x∗ =1and γ∗ =1 .
Because the existing literature (e.g. Swan, 1980; Tirole, 1988) as-
sumes that the entire demand in one period is available as scrap to
the recycling ﬁrms in the next period, it ﬁnds that p∗ = c iﬀ γ∗ =1 .
However, when we allow for heterogeneous consumers to endogenously
choose whether to participate in recycling or not, the additional con-
dition x∗ =1has to hold before the primary producer loses all his
monopoly power. This suggests that the primary producer will have
an incentive to discourage not only the recycling ﬁrms from reprocess-
ing the scrap, but also the consumers from sorting their garbage for
scrap, in order to preserve his monopoly power.
Recall that the recycling ﬁrms choose their recycling eﬀort so as
to equate their marginal cost (∂z
∂γ) to the price of virgin (p). As long
as the monopolist is able to increase this price above his marginal
cost (c), the marginal cost of producing secondary (virgin-equivalent)
aluminum will exceed the marginal cost of producing virgin. This
creates a productive ineﬃciency as too much recycling is undertaken
by the recycling ﬁrms, which get the wrong price signal. Hollander
and Lasserre (1988) cite this as a reason why the monopolist will have
an incentive to integrate into the secondary market.
Suppose both virgin and secondary production came under the
monopolist’s control (the “Pure Monopolist” case in Swan, 1980). TheRecycling with endogenous consumer participation 12
pure monopolist’s combined proﬁti np e r i odt from secondary (πm
t )a n d
virgin production (Πt)w o u l db e
π
m
t +Πt =[ ( ptγt − zt − φt)St]+[(pt − c)(Qt − γtSt)] = (cγt − zt − φt)St+(pt−c)Qt,
where Qt and St+1 are given by (9) and (10). Now, in order to maxi-
mize his combined proﬁt, the pure monopolist will recycle scrap only
up to the point where ∂z
∂γ = c.T h eo p t i m a lγ and hence z(γ),t h e r e -
fore, are functions of c (and not pt, as earlier), and are invariant over
time. We denote them by γ∗ and z∗.A l s o , φt is not a function of
pt a n y m o r e .I n s t e a d ,t h ep u r em o n o p o l i s tc h o o s e sas e q u e n c eo f{pt,





t + Πt). The FOCs with respect to pt and φt are
respectively,





























The value of ∂xt
∂φt is given by (14) and (18) below, and can be ei-
ther positive or negative. Thus the pure monopolist chooses an opti-
mal scrap price, which determines the fraction of the population that
sort. This result is in sharp contrast to Swan’s conclusion for the pure
monopoly case, “the price of scrap φ, and by implication the pur-
chase price p, are immaterial to the monopoly and have no bearing
on the solution. A higher purchase price which is exactly oﬀset by
increased payments for scrap metal is of no consequence since the mo-
nopolist directly controls the recycling activity”(Swan, 1980, p.91).
The diﬀerence between Swan’s result and ours stems from the fact
that Swan’s consumers have zero cost of sorting. Hence any increase
in price of scrap only increases the purchase price p, without aﬀecting
the quantity of scrap sold by consumers in Swan’s model. In contrast,Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 13
consumers are heterogeneous in our model, and an increase in scrap
price increases the amount of scrap sold by consumers.
3. Comparative Statics
What would be the eﬀect of an increase in the network eﬀect para-
meter, α, on the steady state price and the monopoly power enjoyed
by the primary producer? An increase in α would imply a larger pro-
portional decrease in each consumer’s recycling cost, for any given
fraction of the population that recycle. The eﬀect on the steady state
price can be found using the comparative statics methodology. De-
ﬁne the left-hand side of equation (12) as F (p,α). Then provided the
partial derivative of F with respect to p, i.e. Fp, is not zero, we can







Whether the steady state p∗ would increase or decrease as a result
of a change in α would depend on the threshold value of θ that sepa-
rates sorters from non-sorters. In what follows, we focus only on the
two possible interior equilibria for the threshold value of θ, xL and xH,
as deﬁned in (5) and (6).



































Using (15) and (16), eq. (12) takes the following form for x = xL:
F (p,α)=−
½















(1 − 4αφ)1/2 + x
Lγ
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+γφ(p − c){2γ(a − p) − φ(1 − δγ)}(1 − 4αφ(p))
−3/2 . (17)
Thus the sign of Fα depends on the numerical values of the para-
meters.
Concerning Fp, we can show (see Appendix) that, under the as-
sumption that the steady state is stable in the saddlepoint sense, Fp
is negative. We state this as Lemma A:Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 15
Lemma A: Under the assumption that the steady state is stable
in the saddlepoint sense , Fp is negative.
Proof: See the Appendix
Thus we obtain:
Proposition 3: If x = xL, then an increase in the network eﬀect
parameter α will lead to a decrease in the steady state price p∗ if and
only if the the sign of the expression Fα (as given by (17)) is negative.































Using (19) and (20), eq. (12) takes the following form for x = xH:
F (p,α)=−
½















(1 − 4αφ)1/2 + x
Hγ
¶











































−γφ(p − c){2γ(a − p) − φ(1 − δγ)}(1 − 4αφ(p))
−3/2 . (21)
Thus we obtain:
Proposition 4: If x = xH,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nt h en e t w o r ke ﬀect
parameter α will lead to a decrease in the steady state price p∗ if and
only if the the sign of the expression Fα (as given by (21)) is negative.
4. Numerical Analysis
In this section we provide a numerical example to illustrate some
of our analytical results. Suppose the parameters of our model take
the following values:





We ﬁnd that there are two steady states. Variables in the ﬁrst
steady state are denoted by a single asterisk (∗) while those in the
second steady state are denoted by a double asterisk (∗∗).A tt h eﬁrst
steady state, p∗ =0 .414 and x∗ = xL(p∗)=0 .221.( A t p∗ =0 .414,
if we use x = xH(p∗) to substitute into F(.,α) then F(p∗,α) 6=0 ,
i.e., if consumers switch from xL to xH then p∗ ceases to be a steady
state: the virgin producer would be happy to maintain price at p∗ =
0.414 only if consumers expect that the fraction of consumers that
participate in recycling is xL.)
At the second steady state, p∗∗ =0 .316. The corresponding steady-
state scrap price is φ
∗∗ =0 .118,a n dx∗∗ = xH(p∗∗)=0 .976..( A t
p∗∗ =0 .316,i fw eu s ex = xL(p∗∗) to substitute into F(.,α) then
F(p∗∗,α) 6=0 , i.e., if consumers switch from xL to xH then p∗∗ ceases
to be a steady state: the virgin producer would be happy to maintain
price at p∗∗ =0 .319 only if consumers expect that the fraction of
consumers that participate in recycling is xH.)Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 17
At the ﬁrst steady state, the total quantity sold in each period is
Q∗ =0 .687,o u to fw h i c hS∗ =0 .152 is sorted and sold by consumers
as scrap at a price of φ
∗ =0 .177. The recycling ﬁrms transform 64.3
percent (i.e. γ∗ =0 .643) of this scrap into secondary at a cost of z∗ =
8.8637×10−2. Saddlepoint stability is satisﬁed as Fp (p∗,α)=−3.97.
Since Fα (p∗,α)=−0.196,
dp∗
dα < 0 i.e. the steady state price decreases
when the network eﬀect parameter increases.
On the other hand, at the second steady state 97.6 percent of the
population sort. The price of virgin aluminum is lower at p∗∗ =0 .316,
while total quantity sold in each period is higher at Q∗∗ =0 .784.O f
the latter, S∗∗ =0 .766 is sorted and sold by consumers as scrap at a
price of φ
∗∗ =0 .118. The recycling ﬁrms transform only 56.2 percent
(i.e. γ∗∗ =0 .562) of this scrap into secondary at a cost of z∗∗ =
5.9272×10−2. Saddlepoint stability is again satisﬁed as Fp (p∗∗,α)=
−0.807.S i n c eFα (p∗∗,α)=0 .756,
dp∗∗
dα > 0 i.e. the steady state price
now increases when the network eﬀect parameter increases.
The fact that both steady states are stable in the saddlepoint sense
can be explained as follows. The ﬁrst steady state is stable in the sad-
dlepoint sense conditional on the hypothesis that consumers expect
x = xL at p∗ and in some neighborhood of p∗. If for some reason the
expectation is switched to x = xH , the virgin producer will no longer
be happy at p∗, he will choose a diﬀerent price path pt, which eventu-
ally converges to p∗∗ (assuming that the switch to xH is permanent).
Which of the above two steady states is socially more desirable?
To answer this we have to compute social welfare under each steady







































δx(1 − αx) − p
¶
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The total recycling cost (E) of the consumers who participate in




θ(1−αx)q(θ)dθ =( 1− αx)
µ
(a − p + δφ)
x2
2





Total cost of manufacturing virgin and secondary is
c(Q − γS)+zS.
Any aluminum that is not recycled by consumers ends up going
to landﬁlls or incinerators as waste. Landﬁlling and incineration have
well-known environmental costs such as ground water contamination
and air pollution, resulting in decreased value of surrounding land.
Suppose the environmental damage from disposing (Q − S) units of
aluminum as waste is given by D = ε
2 (Q − S)
2 ,where ε>0 is the
environmental damage parameter. Then, deﬁning social welfare (W)
as gross utility minus total cost of recycling by consumers and cost of
manufacturing virgin and secondary by producers minus environmen-
tal damage from waste disposal, we have




2 .( 2 2 )
In what follows, we set ε =1 .
Using our numerical example, social welfare in the low steady state
comes out to be W =0 .350. The monopoly primary producer’s proﬁt
per period is Π =( p − c)(Q − γS)=0 .243. Recycling ﬁrms earn zero
proﬁt. Environmental damage is D =0 .143. Consumer surplus (CS)
is CS = U − E − pQ + φS = U − E − c(Q − γS) − zS − Π =0 .249.
On the other hand, in the high steady state the corresponding
values are W =0 .464, Π =0 .112, D =0 .00016 and CS =0 .353.
Thus, while the monopolist makes less proﬁt in the high steady state,
consumers are better oﬀ.
Notice that social welfare excluding environmental damage (i.e.
Π + CS) is smaller in the high steady state where more consumersRecycling with endogenous consumer participation 19
participate in the recycling eﬀort. However, since most of the metal is
recycled in the high steady state, environmental damage in this state is
much smaller than that in the low steady state. As a result, social wel-
fare turns out to be greater in the high steady state. Of course, if the
environmental damage parameter ε was suﬃciently smaller than that
assumed in our numerical example, social welfare in the low steady
state could turn out to be greater than that in the high steady state.
More recycling would not necessarily be more desirable in that case.
Our analysis suggests a role for the government: by switching con-
sumers’ expectation from xL to xH, the government can steer the
economy away from the low equilibrium.
5. Conclusion
This paper relaxes the assumption made by the existing literature
on the recycling problem that homogeneous consumers always partic-
ipate in recycling. When heterogeneous consumers diﬀer in terms of
their intrinsic recycling cost, we show that all consumers may not al-
ways participate in the recycling process. Consequently, the long-run
price charged by the virgin producer will depend on both the frac-
tion of consumers who recycle as well as the fraction of secondary
aluminum recovered per unit scrap by the recycling ﬁrms.
As discussed in the introduction, consumers’ recycling behaviour
can sometimes be inﬂuenced by social norms and pressures. This can
lead to the existence of a network eﬀect with respect to the consumers’
recycling cost. We show that existence of such an eﬀect can lead to
the emergence of multiple equilibria in certain cases. As a result, an
increase in the scrap price can either increase or decrease the fraction
of consumers that recycle. Moreover, an increase in the network ef-
fect can have a positive or negative impact on the monopolist’s price
of virgin, as illustrated by our numerical example. When there are
multiple steady state equilibria, our analysis suggests that the gov-
ernment might be able to inﬂuence equilibrium selection by switching
consumers’ expectation.Recycling with endogenous consumer participation 20
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APPENDIX: Proof of Lemma A.
(Lemma A: Under the assumption that the steady state is stable
in the saddlepoint sense, Fp is negative.)
The dynamics of the system is given by the Euler’s equation (11),
which is a second-order diﬀerence equation in p.T h i se q u a t i o ng i v e s
us the steady state p∗ when we set pt+1 = pt = pt−1.
To determine the stability of the steady state p∗,w em u s tl i n e a r i z e
the equation (11) around the steady-state p∗, and evaluate the char-
acteristic roots.
Equation (11) is of the non-linear form
G(pt+1,p t,p t−1,α)=0









































Note that the second order condition (obtained by diﬀerentiating





















a − pt−1 +
δφt
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+δ(pt+1 − c)γt+1xt+1 (24)


























(φxp + xφp)+γx+( p − c)
d(γx)
dp
Evaluated at (pt+1,p t,p t−1)=( p∗,p ∗,p ∗) we have
A = δC
Equation (23) gives rise to the characteristic equation
Aλ

































By “regular saddlepoint stability”, we mean that both roots are
real and positive, with one root exceeding unity and the other rootRecycling with endogenous consumer participation 23
is inside the interval (0,1). The two roots are real and distinct if
B2 > 4AC. Assume this condition holds. Since, from (25),
λ1λ2 = C/A = δ>0
we conclude that the roots are either both positive, or both negative.
Also, from (25),
λ1 + λ2 = −
B
A
both roots are positive if and only if −B/A > 0.S i n c eB<0 by the
second order condition, it follows that A>0 is a necessary condition
for regular saddlepoint stability. Since A = δC, A>0 implies C>0
as well.
Recall that the condition for regular saddlepoint stability is that
the larger root exceeds 1 and the smaller root is inside the interval
(0,1).G i v e nt h a tA>0, C>0 and B<0, this condition is satisﬁed
if and only if
0 >A+ B + C
It follows that regular saddlepoint stability implies A+B+C<0.
But clearly, by deﬁnition,
Fp(p
∗,α)=Gpt+1(pt+1,p t,pt−1,α)+Gpt(pt+1,p t,pt−1,α)+Gpt−1(pt+1,p t,pt−1,α)
where (pt+1,p t,pt−1) is evaluated at (p∗,p ∗,p ∗). So regular saddlepoint
stability implies Fp < 0.
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
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